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Abstract
This paper investigates how monetary policy interventions by the European Central Bank
and the Federal Reserve affect the stock market perception of bank systemic risk. In a first
step, we identify monetary policy shocks using a structural VAR approach by exploiting
the changes of the volatility of these shocks on days on which there are monetary policy
announcements. The second step consists of a panel regression analysis, in which we relate
monetary policy shocks to market-based measures of bank systemic risk. Our sample includes
information on both Euro Area and U.S. listed banks, covering a sample period from October
2008 to December 2015. We condition the impact of the monetary policy shocks on a set
of bank-specific variables, thereby allowing for a heterogeneous transmission of monetary
policy. We furthermore use the differences between Euro Area core and periphery countries
and the additional granularity of U.S. accounting data to assess which channels determine
the transmission of monetary policy. Our results indicate that by supporting weaker banks
and allowing banks to delay recognizing bad loans, accommodative monetary policy may
contribute to the buildup of vulnerabilities in the banking sector and may make an eventual
policy tightening more difficult. On the other hand, a continuation of expansionary monetary
policy may increase risk-taking incentives by further compressing banks’ net interest margins.
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1. Introduction
Since the major central banks have embarked on programs of unconventional monetary
policy, the potential trade-off between monetary stability and financial stability has received
increasing attention from policymakers and academics (Smets, 2014; Adrian and Liang, 2016).
The objective of this paper is to contribute to this topic by focusing on the link between
monetary policy and the systemic risk of the banking sector in the Euro Area and the
United States, and hence on a trade-off between the mandated objectives of the central
banks and financial stability. While there is evidence on the impact of monetary policy
actions on bank lending risk, we argue that it is useful to assess the total impact of various
channels of monetary policy transmission on the overall systemic risk of banks. From a
regulatory and supervisory point of view, it is equally important to identify which banks, or
which bank business models, are most exposed to monetary policy measures. We therefore
investigate how actions undertaken by the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve
between October 2008 and December 2015 affect systemic risk of European and U.S. banks
as perceived by stock markets. To assess the relative importance of different transmission
channels, we allow the impact of monetary policy actions to vary across banks.
Our analysis consists of three components. First, using a structural vector autoregression
(VAR), we estimate the monetary policy shock by assuming that it will be more volatile
on days on which there are monetary policy announcements. This ’identification-through-
heteroskedasticity’ approach, which was first proposed by Rigobon and Sack (2003, 2004),
is ultimately based on the observation that monetary policy announcements will dominate
other news on these days. Wright (2012) further develops this approach so that it does not
require the definition of a specific policy instrument, hence allowing its use in an environment
characterized by the zero lower bound and unconventional monetary policy programs. This
method displays some advantages over alternative approaches, because it does not require
to either propose an alternative policy instrument, e.g. the size of the central bank balance
sheet, or to define the appropriate length of the event window, as is necessary in event
studies. We find that the data support our identification strategy as the standard deviation
of the structural monetary shock is found to more than double on announcement days in
both the Euro Area and the United States. Second, we define bank systemic risk as a bank’s
contribution to the risk of the financial system as a whole as in, for instance, Acharya et al.,
2010. This definition comprises a bank’s vulnerability to systemwide stress as well as the
risk of extreme losses spilling over to the rest of the financial system. In line with most of
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the literature we estimate bank systemic risk using financial market information (see e.g.
Billio et al., 2012, Huang et al., 2012, Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016, Acharya et al., 2012,
and Van Oordt and Zhou, 2014, for different approaches). Finally, we assess the impact of
monetary shocks on bank systemic risk using a panel regression framework. By interacting
the shock with a set of bank characteristics capturing the business model, we can furthermore
evaluate the relative importance of different transmission channels.
Our results indicate that during the period under study expansionary monetary policy
actions have supported banks’ profitability and lowered their risk-taking incentives by in-
creasing banks’ net interest margins. However, maintaining accommodative monetary policy
further in the future may compress net interest margins and lead to the buildup of financial
vulnerabilities within the banking sector. Second, we find that more risky banks benefit more
from expansionary monetary policy actions. Specifically, in response to monetary easing sys-
temic risk declines more (or increases less) for banks that are characterized by a riskier asset
composition, a more vulnerable funding structure or a lower level of capital adequacy. A com-
parison of these effects between core and peripheral Euro Area countries furthermore reveals
that they are more important for banks in periphery countries. Consistent with Lambert
and Ueda (2014), we also find evidence suggesting that accommodative monetary policy may
delay balance sheet repair in the banking sector, by allowing banks more room to postpone
recognizing bad loans. The expansionary monetary policy regime following the financial crisis
may therefore have contributed to a build up of vulnerabilities within the banking sector.
Consequently, a tightening of monetary policy may imperil financial stability in the medium
term.
This paper is related to a growing literature investigating the effect of monetary policy on
financial stability, and specifically bank risk-taking. These papers often use detailed loan-level
data to check whether banks increase the risk of new loans in response to a decrease of interest
rates (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2016; Ioannidou et al., 2015; Jiménez et al., 2014; Paligorova and
Santos, 2013)1. We contribute to this literature by analyzing the transmission of monetary
policy shocks to overall bank systemic risk, using stock market based measures of bank risk
1Maddaloni and Peydró (2013) and Buch et al. (2014) instead use survey data from the ECB’s Bank
Lending Survey and the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending, respectively.
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as in Altunbas et al. (2014). We furthermore argue that the impact of monetary policy
interventions on banks may differ according to the business model following, among others,
Ricci (2015), Delis and Kouretas (2011) and Brissimis and Delis (2010). Therefore we assess
the importance of a set of bank characteristics that have been shown to determine the long-
term profitability and risk profile of the banks (Mergaerts and Vander Vennet, 2016) in the
transmission of monetary policy to systemic risk. These variables capture the asset, funding,
capital and income structure of the banks.
The remainder of the paper is structured in the following way. In section 2, we discuss
the transmission of monetary policy to bank systemic risk and the role of different bank
characteristics. This results in several testable hypotheses. In section 3, we provide details
on the methodology used in this paper to estimate the monetary policy shock and to measure
bank systemic risk. We also present the panel regression framework that will be used to assess
the strength of different transmission channels. Section 4 presents the data. In section 5 we
discuss the results of our estimations and provide an analysis of the impact of monetary
policy on financial stability. Section 6 concludes the paper with some policy implications.
2. Monetary policy and bank systemic risk
Expansionary monetary policy interventions ease financial conditions, but may also affect
the risk-taking incentives of banks and hence influence financial stability. In this paper
we investigate whether accommodative monetary policy promotes or deteriorates financial
stability. If the impact is negative, this would imply a trade-off between stimulating the
economy and avoiding the buildup of vulnerabilities within the financial system. In the
following discussion we describe the different transmission channels of monetary policy to
bank systemic risk, which are summarized in figure 1.
2.1. Monetary policy and bank systemic risk
When a central bank lowers its policy rate or expands its balance sheet, these actions
feed through in market interest rates (columns 1 and 2 in figure 1). A direct positive impact
of decreasing short-term interest rates for banks is that this is normally associated with
an increasing net interest margin (NIM) and hence bank profitability. The rising NIM
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is furthermore expected to affect banks’ risk-taking incentives by increasing the pay-off of
monitoring (see e.g. Dell’Ariccia et al., 2014). Both effects are expected to translate into a
higher stock market valuation and lower riskiness. However, this channel may be reversed
when deposit rates approach the zero lower bound and long-term interest rates are decreasing
as well, compressing net interest margins (Borio et al., 2015; Busch and Memmel, 2015). In
the period between 2008 and 2015 central banks have kept short-term interest rates very
low and have implemented unconventional monetary policy programs, some of which were
specifically designed to decrease long-term interest rates (e.g. forward guidance and operation
twist). To the extent that the continuous decline of long-term interest rates decreases banks’
net interest margin, it may increase their risk-taking incentives, e.g. as a consequence of
search-for-yield (Rajan, 2005; Chodorow-Reich, 2014). If these risks are correlated across
banks, as was the case in the run-up to the real estate crisis in, among other countries, the
U.S. and Ireland, a period of low interest rates may increase systemic risk more for banks
that already focus more on lending.
Second, expansionary monetary policy interventions tend to boost asset prices and can
therefore be considered as what Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) have labeled stealth
recapitalization, i.e. the increase of the value of legacy assets leads to a higher net worth of
the bank. If stock market investors consider the revaluation of bank assets as sustainable, it
may lead to lower bank systemic risk. A rising value of collateral pledged to secure bank loans
may furthermore reduce the loss given default of bank portfolios, increasing their value as
well. Finally, by stimulating the economy, expansionary monetary policy actions can further
support loan quality by lowering default probabilities. This channel may therefore lead to a
positive relationship between expansionary monetary policy and bank profitability and net
worth. These effects are then expected to reduce bank systemic risk.
Finally, in both the Euro Area and the United States the start of the financial crisis in
September 2008 was characterized by problems in wholesale funding markets, which laid bare
the interconnectedness of the financial system and its potential for contagion. In response,
monetary authorities have undertaken actions to improve the liquidity position of the banking
sector. The alleviation of funding risk may have contributed to lower funding costs, and hence
higher bank profitability, and a decline of banks’ vulnerability to further financial shocks.
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Given sufficient demand for credit, central bank liquidity provision may furthermore improve
banks’ lending capacity (Boeckx et al., 2014) and thereby increase profitability (column 4
in figure 1). These effects should translate in a decrease of systemic risk. However, stealth
recapitalization and the ample availability of central bank liquidity may also allow banks
to postpone cleaning up their balance sheets by writing off non-performing loans (Acharya
et al., 2016; Lambert and Ueda, 2014; Peek and Rosengren, 2005). Such forbearance may
increase uncertainty about potential future write-offs, and hence depress market values and
increase bank systemic risk (column 5 in figure 1).
2.2. Monetary policy transmission and bank heterogeneity
While monetary policy interventions are likely to affect bank systemic risk, each bank
may internalize these interventions differently conditional on its business model. In order
to model the heterogeneity of the impact of monetary policy actions, we allow it to vary
according to a set of business model characteristics. In practice, we capture the business
model by accounting measures of asset, funding, capital and income structure.
A bank’s asset structure may affect the transmission of monetary policy shocks to bank
systemic risk in several ways. First, because banks characterized by a loan-oriented asset
composition are more sensitive to changes in the net interest margin, we expect these banks
to react more strongly to monetary policy shocks. However, it is impossible to predict
the sign of this relationship because the impact of expansionary monetary policy on the
NIM is ambiguous (columns 1 and 2 in figure 1). As accommodative monetary policy
programs have influenced both short-term and long-term interest rates, the net effect of the
loan ratio on the transmission of monetary policy to bank systemic risk may even become
zero. Second, the increase of collateral values and the improvement of economic and financial
conditions as a consequence of accommodative monetary policy might also lower risk and
increase profitability more for banks that rely more on loans. Increasing asset prices and
decreasing risk premiums may furthermore be especially beneficial for banks with high asset
risk. Finally, banks with high loan ratios and lower loan quality may have stronger incentives
to use the access to central bank liquidity to delay recognizing bad loans. According to this
forbearance channel, markets may therefore consider banks with higher loan ratios to become
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more systemically risky and less profitable following an expansionary monetary policy shock,
especially if there are doubts about the loan quality 2.
The impact of the bank’s income structure on the transmission of monetary policy on
systemic risk also depends on the pass-through of expansionary interventions on the bank’s
net interest margin. A bank that relies more on activities that generate net interest income
may benefit more from monetary policies that lower short-term interest rates, while it may
face declining profitability if long-term rates decrease as well.
With respect to a bank’s funding structure the literature offers different hypotheses for
its influence on the transmission of monetary policy shocks to bank systemic risk. First,
by lowering banks’ dependence on wholesale markets, access to central bank funding may
have made banks less vulnerable to systemic shocks. The funding risk hypothesis therefore
implies that expansionary monetary policy is more beneficial (or less harmful) for banks
that rely more on market-based funding sources. Second, a high reliance on deposit funding
may weaken private monitoring because customer deposits are typically protected by deposit
insurance and this feature may intensify agency problems (see e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache, 2002, and Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004). As such, the share of insured
deposits may influence stock market expectations about banks’ reactions to changes in the
net interest margin. Again, the impact of expansionary monetary policy actions on the
NIM , and therefore the role of the deposit ratio, is not a priori clear. The literature,
however, mainly finds that expansionary monetary policy actions benefit banks with low
deposit ratios. Mamatzakis and Bermpei (2016) show that the negative impact of the Federal
Reserve’s expansionary policies is stronger for banks characterized by a high deposit ratio
(see also Yin and Yang, 2013). For the Euro Area, Ricci (2015) provides event study-based
evidence that, in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock, stock prices of banks
with a higher deposit ratio rise less than those of banks that rely more on wholesale funding.
Concerning the impact of a bank’s capital ratio on the effects of monetary policy shocks,
the banking literature advances divergent theories. Most straightforward, less capitalized
2Such doubts may be stronger for banks in Euro Area periphery countries. For instance in Italy non-
performing loans have tripled during our sample period, eventually rising to a proportion of 18% of total
outstanding loans by December 2015. Garrido et al. (2016) suggest that write-offs may have taken too long
because of economic and legal obstacles.
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banks may benefit more from accommodative changes in the monetary policy stance, be-
cause markets consider them to be less safe. Furthermore, because they rely more on debt
funding, their profitability is more responsive to monetary policy shocks that affect short- and
long-term interest rates (Ricci, 2015; Yin and Yang, 2013; Madura and Schnusenberg, 2000).
Theories focusing on the moral hazard induced by monetary policy shocks consider the cap-
ital ratio to capture the severity of agency problems within banks, i.e. less capitalized banks
have more incentives to transfer risks to debtholders. The search-for-yield channel implies
that banks increase risk-taking when interest rates decline and that the strength of this effect
increases with the prevalence of agency problems. This implies that less capitalized banks
are expected to increase risk more in the case of an expansionary monetary policy shock. On
the other hand, the risk-shifting channel (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2014) suggests that, as far as
expansionary monetary policy increases banks’ net interest margins, it increases their incen-
tives to monitor and hence should lower risk. This effect is expected to be stronger for banks
with low capital ratios that have more scope to reduce risk, because more highly capitalized
banks’ monitoring incentives are less dependent on the stance of monetary policy. De Nicolò
et al. (2010) and Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016) provide evidence supporting the existence of a
risk-shifting effect in the United States. However, the risk-shifting channel could be reversed
if monetary policy actions focus on lowering long-term interest rates, thereby reducing banks’
net interest margins and increasing less capitalized banks’ risk-taking incentives. These hy-
potheses are also summarized in figure 1. In this paper we investigate the relative strength of
these hypotheses in order to assess the trade-off between traditional objectives of monetary
policy and financial stability.
3. Methodology
In this section we discuss the three components of our methodology. In section 3.1 we
describe the estimation of the monetary policy shocks and analyze the results of applying our
identification strategy. In section 3.2 we define bank systemic risk and the set of variables
we use to measure it. Finally, in section 3.3, we present the panel setup we use to assess the
impact of monetary policy actions on bank systemic risk. This model allows the impact of
the monetary policy shock to vary across banks and over time by taking into account the
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heterogeneity of banks’ business models.
3.1. Monetary policy shock
3.1.1. Model
We estimate a time series of the exogenous monetary policy shock by modeling a set of
relevant financial variables in a structural VAR model at daily frequency. Our identification
strategy, which was first proposed by Rigobon and Sack (2003, 2004) and adapted by Wright
(2012), is based on the assumption that the structural monetary policy shock is more volatile
on days on which there is a monetary policy announcement (the specific set of days must be
determined a priori). On the other hand, the volatility of any other structural shocks and the
transmission of the shock within the model are assumed to be time-invariant3. Other studies
employing this ‘identification-through-heteroskedasticity’ methodology to identify the effects
of structural monetary policy shocks include, for example, Rogers et al. (2014), Arai (2015)
and Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2013).
Estimating the monetary policy shock this way has some advantages over alternative ap-
proaches. First, while event studies are often used to identify the impact of monetary policy
announcements on bond yields and financial markets (e.g. Neely, 2015, Gagnon et al., 2011,
Joyce et al., 2011, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011, Swanson, 2011, and Taylor
and Williams, 2009), they may be susceptible to simultaneity bias as a consequence of con-
current financial shocks that influence monetary policy as well as asset prices. To circumvent
this problem, some event studies use an intraday event window and effectively assume that
the variance of the other shocks within this window is zero (Joyce and Tong, 2012). Gilchrist
and Zakrajsek (2013) document that event study approaches therefore underestimate the
impact of monetary policy announcements. On the other hand, event studies also require
full adjustment of asset prices within the event window. However, because unconventional
monetary policy actions were mostly untested in the Euro Area and the U.S., adjustment
periods may be longer and would hence require longer event windows (Neely, 2015; Meaning
and Zhu, 2011). Finally, some announcements may have been largely anticipated, leading to
3Note that this time-invariance is a necessary condition for identification, but that it excludes the possi-
bility to examine and compare the impacts of different policies, e.g. conventional interest rate changes and
unconventional asset purchasing programs.
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limited adjustments of asset prices and bond yields within the event window. In our model
we do not assume the absence of other shocks on announcement days, but only that they
become relatively less important compared to the monetary policy shock. We can further-
more estimate the monetary policy shock on non-announcement days to pick up anticipation
of monetary policy actions. Second, most other approaches require the definition of a policy
instrument. However, using the short-term interest rate may be problematic due to the zero
lower bound. Alternative measures have therefore been proposed, including the size of the
central bank balance sheet (Garcia Pascual and Wieladek, 2016; Boeckx et al., 2014; Gam-
bacorta et al., 2014), the interbank interest rate (Gambacorta and Shin, 2016), long-term
interest rates (Chen et al., 2012, 2015; Gilchrist et al., 2014) or the term spread (Baumeis-
ter and Benati, 2013)4. The identification-through-heteroskedasticity approach allows us to
avoid having to choose a specific policy instrument.
The identification of the monetary policy shocks is based on the following structural VAR
model:
Yt = A1Yt−1 + · · ·+ ApYt−p +Rνt (1)
where Yt is anN -dimensional vector of endogenous variables (t = 1, . . . , T ), νt anN -dimensional
vector of orthogonal structural innovations with mean zero and A1, . . . , Ap and R are N ×N
time-invariant parameter matrices. The reduced-form residuals corresponding to this struc-
tural model are given by the relationship εt = Rνt. In this model we assume that the first5
structural shock changes on announcement days, while the other structural innovations are
homoskedastic, so that:
V ar (νt) = Ωt =

Ω(0) = diag (ω1, ω2, . . . , ωN) if no announcement
Ω(1) = diag (ω∗1, ω2, . . . , ωN) if announcement
(2)
It can be shown that, as long as the covariance matrix of the reduced form errors Vt changes
on announcement days, these assumptions suffice to uniquely identify the first column of R
4Another approach consists of estimating a latent policy stance, such as a shadow policy rate (Lombardi
and Zhu, 2014) or a latent propensity for QE (Meinusch and Tillmann, 2016).
5Note that ordering the monetary policy shock first is purely for convenience and does not affect the
model.
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and the structural monetary policy shock apart from their scale and sign. In our setup we
normalize the monetary policy shock by fixing the response on impact of one of the included
variables to a unit monetary policy shock.
3.1.2. Estimation and testing
To estimate the model defined by equations 1 and 2, we follow the iterative estimation
procedure of Lanne and Lütkepohl (2008). It consists of the following steps:
1. The reduced form VAR model in (1) is estimated using OLS, i.e. under the assump-
tion of homoskedasticity. The estimated residuals are used to construct estimates of
the covariance matrices Vt. Defining Dt as a dummy variable that takes value 1 on
announcement days and 0 on other days, we can write:
V˜t =

∑T
t=1(1−Dt)εˆtεˆ
′
t
T−
∑T
t=1Dt
if Dt = 0∑T
t=1Dtεˆtεˆ
′
t∑T
t=1Dt
if Dt = 1
(3)
2. Using our estimates for Vt, we minimize the following loss function to obtain the esti-
mates for R and Ωt:
(
Rˆ, Ωˆt
)
= arg min
Rˆ,Ωˆt
{
−
(
T∑
t=1
log |RΩtR′|+ tr
[
V˜t (RΩtR′)−1
])}
(4)
3. The estimates Rˆ and Ωˆt can then be used to re-estimate the VAR model in (1) by
FGLS. This step again results in estimates for the reduced form residuals, which are
used to construct new estimates of Vt.
Steps 2 and 3 are iterated until convergence, resulting in Gaussian maximum likelihood esti-
mators if we do not impose that the residuals are normally distributed (and quasi-maximum
likelihood estimators otherwise). Using Rˆ and the FGLS estimates of the reduced form errors,
we can then trace out the structural monetary policy shock.
Since the identification strategy relies on the presence of a heteroskedastic monetary policy
shock, it is important to test whether our model indeed supports a rejection of homoskedastic
11
errors. The following hypothesis is therefore of interest:

H0 : ω1 = ω∗1
H1 : ω1 6= ω∗1
(5)
In other words, we compare the homoskedastic model under the null hypothesis to a model in
which we relax the restriction on one parameter, i.e. we do not impose ω∗1 = ω1 . Our use of
(Q)ML estimators enables us to perform a likelihood ratio test6 to examine this hypothesis.
3.1.3. Results
To estimate the VAR we use a set of variables that should capture the pass-through of
monetary policy to the financial sector. Hence, following Rogers et al. (2014), we select those
variables that are expected to respond most to a monetary policy shock. For both the Euro
Area and the U.S. we include a medium- and long-term interest rate, a measure for inflation
expectations and the return and implied volatility of a broad stock market index. Because
the sovereign debt crisis has forced the ECB to implement unconventional policy actions
aimed at restoring the transmission of monetary policy, we furthermore include a sovereign
stress indicator in the Euro Area VAR. Details of the specific variables can be found in table
1. A VAR of order 2 is estimated over a sample period from 1 October 2008 to 31 December
20157.
The identification of the monetary policy shock requires a set of announcement dates for
both central banks. For the ECB we include all announcements pertaining to interest rates,
asset purchase programs, long-term refinancing operations, central bank funding conditions,
forward guidance and new swap arrangements with other central banks8. Federal Reserve
6In the framework of this model these tests will retain their standard asymptotical properties. We refer
to Lanne and Lütkepohl (2008) for a more complete discussion of their statistical properties.
7In unreported regressions we find that the results are robust to different choices of the VAR order.
8Interest rate announcements also include the ECB governing council decisions to leave the interest rate
unchanged so that all governing council meetings are present in the set of announcement dates. Asset
purchase programs announcements relate to the three covered bond purchase programs, the ABS purchase
program, the (sterilized) securities markets program, the outright monetary transactions and the public sector
purchase program. The corporate sector purchase program was announced in April 2016 and is therefore not
part of the sample. With central bank funding conditions we refer to changes in tendering procedures such
as fixed-rate full allotment and collateral requirements.
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announcement dates include interest rate decisions as well as announcements regarding asset
purchase programs, lending facility conditions, forward guidance and swap agreements9. This
selection procedure leads to a set of 106 announcements in the Euro Area and 81 in the United
States. Details on the specific dates and announcements can be found in the appendix in
tables A.1 and A.2 for the Euro Area and United States, respectively. While the specific
choice of announcement dates is of course open for debate, we believe our choices to be
reasonable10. Finally, our identification strategy only identifies the shock up to its scale
and sign. We therefore define a unit expansionary monetary policy shock as a shock that
decreases the Spanish 5 year CDS spread by 25 basis points upon impact for the Euro Area
and as a shock that decreases the 10 year treasury bill yield by 25 basis points for the U.S.,
in line with Wright (2012) and Rogers et al. (2014).
The estimation of the model yields variance multipliers of 4.45 and 5.96 for the Euro Area
and the United States, respectively, implying that the standard deviation of the monetary
shock is more than twice as high on announcement days in both regions. A likelihood
ratio test for the hypothesis test (equation 5) results in test statistics of 166.79 for the
Euro Area and 213.76 for the U.S., so that the null hypothesis of equal variance on both
announcement and non-announcement days is strongly rejected by the data. Hence these
tests provide support to our identification strategy. In figure 2 we present the impulse
response functions of the variables to a unit monetary policy shock. In the Euro Area
(figure 2a) we find that an expansionary monetary policy shock increases long-term inflation
expectations and the value of the broad stock market index, while decreasing market-wide
implied volatility (V STOXX). Although the negative contemporaneous impact on sovereign
stress is a consequence of our identification strategy, the effect remains significantly negative
across the whole horizon. We do not observe a significant impact on the yields of the medium-
9As for the ECB we include all announcements following FOMC meetings, even if they only decide to
keep the interest rate unchanged. Asset purchase programs include the three quantitative easing programs
and the (sterilized) operation twist. Lending facility conditions refer to both the institution and closing of
specific lending facilities such as the term auction facility and the term ABS loan facility, among others.
10In an unreported analysis, we experiment with different choices for the set of announcement dates. We
find that a more strict choice of dates, e.g. leaving out the ECB governing council meetings that produced
no interest rate changes or UMP actions, leads to an increase of the variance change of the monetary policy
shock on announcement days, but that it does not affect any of our further results.
13
and long-term safe assets, possibly due to a flight-to-safety effect in which monetary easing
lowers the demand for safe assets, such as German bunds, by decreasing the risk of stressed
sovereign bonds (see also Rogers et al., 2014, and Altavilla et al., 2014). For the United
States the effects are very similar, in that we observe a positive effect on long-term inflation
expectations and the value of the S&P500 stock market index and a negative effect on market-
wide implied volatility (V IX). However, for the U.S. the effect of an expansionary monetary
policy shock on medium- and long-term safe asset yields is significantly negative over the
entire horizon. The decline of the ten-year treasury yield furthermore exceeds that of the
two-year yield, flattening the yield curve.
Finally, in figure 3 we plot the time series for the cumulative monetary policy shock for
both the Euro Area and the United States11. A rise in the cumulative series corresponds to an
expansionary monetary policy shock relative to the prevailing financial market conditions,
so that the series itself reflects the stance of monetary policy. The graphs show that the
shocks are able to capture important monetary policy measures, as well as the anticipation
of some measures. For the Euro Area, the one-year LTRO/CBPP1 announcement in May
2009 and the SMP announcement in May 2010 are among the largest expansionary daily
shocks and can therefore be considered surprises to financial markets. On the other hand,
the OMT announcement of September 2012 and the QE announcement of January 2015
appear to have been largely anticipated following preceding speeches by ECB president Mario
Draghi, in which he alluded on the implementation of additional unconventional monetary
policy measures. For the United States, the announcement of the first quantitative easing
program (QE1) is identified as the largest shock, and hence the largest surprise to financial
markets, while the small shocks on the QE2 and QE3 announcement days suggest that these
programs were largely anticipated. Further in line with anticipation, the cumulative monetary
policy shock reflect the buildup of the accommodative monetary policy stance around the
announcements of the QE1, Operation Twist and QE3 programs, at which the central bank
had hinted in prior speeches. The cumulative shock gradually decreases following the taper
announcement in May 2013 and the signals of a federal funds rate increase at the end of 2014.
11Note that the cumulative shock does not necessarily sum to zero, due to the use of feasible GLS for its
estimation.
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As such, the inspection of the cumulative monetary policy shock series further supports the
appropriateness of our identification strategy.
3.2. Bank systemic risk
In line with Acharya et al. (2010, 2012) and Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) we define
a bank’s systemic risk as its contribution to the risk of the financial system as a whole. This
definition encompasses two complementary dimensions. First, it means that a bank’s systemic
risk increases as it becomes more vulnerable to adverse shocks within the financial system as
a whole. If a bank is prone to suffer extreme losses during an industry-wide stress event, its
activities are less likely to be taken up by other actors within the financial sector, because
their ability to do so is also severely impaired. In addition, a potential recapitalization to
allow the bank to continue its activities is both difficult and costly during a systemic event
due to the entire banking system being undercapitalized. However, if the bank is able to bear
severe losses, it can continue its activities without requiring recapitalization. Hence, bank
capital is a crucial second dimension of systemic risk. In figure 4 we illustrate the trade-off
between the capital ratio (horizontal axis) and the vulnerability to systemic shocks, measured
as the proportion of equity capital a bank would lose (vertical axis). The lines in this figure
are isoquants of equal levels of post-shock capital ratios, so that a lower value reflects higher
systemic risk. It is clear that, to maintain an equivalent level of systemic risk, a bank should
raise its capital ratio when it becomes more vulnerable to system-wide shocks.
We estimate the first dimension, a bank’s vulnerability to large financial shocks, using
the marginal expected shortfall (Acharya et al., 2010):
MESi,t = −Et(ri,t+1|rm,t+1 < C)
MES estimates the expected drop in the share price of bank i in case of an adverse event
affecting the economy, which is defined as a broad market return below some threshold C.
A financial crisis, however, is defined as a longer period with potentially severe cumulative
drops in the valuation of banks’ equity. In our analysis we therefore focus on the long-run
MES, which estimates the valuation loss a bank would incur following a stock market decline
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of 40% over a period of six months12:
LRMESi,t = −Et(ri,t+6M |rm,t+6M < −40%)
The second component, the perception of the stock market of a bank’s capacity to absorb
unexpected losses is, given the amount of assets, reflected by the total market value of its
equity (MV ). Finally, to analyze systemic risk, we need to consider the potential trade-off be-
tween systemic vulnerability and capitalization. We therefore combine the two components,
which yields our measure of bank systemic risk, the stressed market value (SMV ).
SMVi,t = (1− LRMESi,t)×MVi,t
SMV is the capital the bank is expected to end up with in the event of a large adverse shock
to the financial system. This variable can be considered as the market-based equivalent of
the accounting-based simulated stress test exercises that are currently being undertaken on
a regular basis by bank supervisors in Europe, the U.S. and other jurisdictions13. Because
monetary policy affects the market’s perception of the value of a bank’s assets and its vul-
nerability to stress events, SMV is likely to react immediately to announcements regarding
monetary policy. Finally, SMV can capture a potential risk-return trade-off if LRMES and
MV react in different ways. A monetary policy action that lowers the interest rate may, for
instance, increase a bank’s market capitalization through a higher net interest margin, but
at the same time increase risk-taking. By analyzing both components we can quantify this
potential trade-off.
3.3. Transmission of monetary policy and bank heterogeneity
In order to investigate the impact of monetary policy on the market’s perception of
banks’ systemic risk we conduct a panel analysis in which we account for bank heterogeneity.
12Our estimation of the MES follows Brownlees and Engle (2012) setting C to −2% and using an ADCC
model to construct series of time-varying return volatilities and correlations. The ADCC model is estimated
over the period ranging from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2015. We construct the LRMES as 1 −
exp(−18 ∗MESit) as in Acharya et al. (2012).
13The relationship between marginal expected shortfall and stress testing scenarios is documented in more
detail by Acharya et al. (2014).
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Concretely, we estimate the following panel model using variables of monthly frequency:
Yi,t = αi + (β0 +
K∑
k=1
βkBMk,i,t)× Shockt +
K∑
k=1
γkBMk,i,t + εi,t (6)
in which Yi,t represents one of the dependent variables, BMi,t is a vector of business model
characteristics and Shockt is the value of the monetary policy shock in month t. In using
this approach, we allow the impact of the monetary policy shock to vary both over banks
and over time, conditioning the effect on the bank’s business model.
Our main dependent variable is the monthly percentage change of the stressed market
value ∆SMV as a measure of a bank’s systemic risk. We also use as dependent variables the
components of the change of SMV , i.e. changes in the LRMES and in market valuation.
Note that we consider the changes of these variables because the monetary policy shock is
itself interpreted as a change in the stance of monetary policy. We focus on the immediate
changes in bank systemic risk due to monetary policy that are solely driven by the changing
market appraisal of the bank. However,MV is also influenced by dividend payouts or changes
in the outstanding number of shares, e.g. because of new issuance or share buybacks. We
therefore measure MV by a total return index so that ∆MV equals the monthly holding
period return.
The business model characteristics in BM are derived from the banks’ balance sheets and
the income statements and capture the asset, liability, capital and income structure of the
banks. However, while our panel analysis is conducted on monthly frequency, accounting data
are only available on an annual basis in the Euro Area and on a quarterly basis in the United
States. To tackle this issue we replace the value of the business model variables by their last
known value of the previous month, e.g. the value reported for the end of December 2014
is used for the entire year of 2015 in Europe and for the first quarter of 2015 in the United
States. By using the last known value prior to month t we also avoid endogeneity issues
as systemic risk and market valuation may also influence a bank’s business model decisions.
Finally, the dependent variables ∆LRMES, ∆MV and ∆SMV and the monetary policy
shock are aggregated from daily to monthly frequency so that they reflect the changes of
systemic risk and the monetary policy stance over the entire month. Hence, the changes in
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the systemic risk measures are computed using end-of-month values, while the change of the
monetary policy stance is calculated as the sum of the shocks during the month.
4. Data
To conduct our analysis we require both financial market and accounting data for a
set of listed Euro Area and U.S. banks. With respect to the Euro Area we obtain annual
balance sheet and income statement data from Bankscope and daily stock return data from
Datastream, which are linked based on the ISIN codes. We limit the sample to banks of which
the Bankscope specialization is either bank holding company, commercial bank, cooperative
bank, investment bank or real estate and mortgage bank. We furthermore exclude financial
holding companies that lack banking activity of their own and the listed regional branches of
the French bank Crédit Agricole. For the U.S. sample we collect quarterly balance sheet and
income statement data from the FR Y-9C reports and daily stock return data from CRSP on
all listed U.S. bank holding companies. The financial market data is linked to the accounting
based data using the identifier match provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York14.
Finally, because the MES is estimated on a daily frequency we require that the stocks in
our analysis are liquidly traded. In the Euro Area we therefore impose that at least 75% of
returns are non-zero during the sample period, while for U.S. banks we require that there
should be trading activity on at least 85% of trading days15. After the application of this
data selection procedure we end up with 63 Euro Area banks resulting in 4502 observations
and 438 U.S. bank holding companies for a total of 24467 monthly observations.
On the basis of the accounting data we construct a set of business model variables to
capture the asset, liability, capital and income structure of the banks. We also include
bank size, measured by total assets, as a control variable. The more granular nature of the
(publicly available) FR Y-9C reports allows us to define a more detailed set of variables
14We control for business model changes through mergers by creating a new bank identifier when a bank’s
size increases by more than 50% (otherwise it is classified as an acquisition). Similarly, we also create a new
identifier when the bank’s size decreases by more than 50% in one quarter to control for large divestments
that may fundamentaly affect a bank’s business model. Finally, we make sure that we have continuous data
on each bank by creating a new identifier whenever there is a gap in the bank-specific time series.
15The threshold is put lower for the Euro Area due to the lower available number of listed banks and hence
the need to maintain the representativeness of the sample, especially with respect to subsample analysis.
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for U.S. banks. In table 2 we present descriptive statistics for both the dependent and the
independent variables. Note that all variables have been winsorized per month to control for
potential noise in the estimation induced by outliers16.
5. Results
In table 3 we report the impact of an expansionary monetary policy shock on banks’
systemic risk exposure based on the specification in equation 6. As outlined in section
3.3, we consider the effect on the change of the stressed market value (∆SMV ), as well
as on its components. The change of the market value (∆MV ) and the change of the
LRMES (∆LRMES) reflect the shift in the stock market’s assessment of the banks’ value
and vulnerability to systemwide downward shocks, respectively. Given that the interest of
this paper lies in the heterogeneity of banks’ responses to monetary policy, we only present
the coefficients of the interaction effects (β0 to βK in equation 6). In addition, in table 4
we present results in which the Euro Area sample is split into core and periphery countries,
the latter group consisting of Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, to exploit regional
differences. Finally, we make use of the more granular data of U.S. bank holding companies,
which can be obtained from the FR Y-9C reports. These results are shown in table 5.
Before advancing to a detailed analysis of our results, we discuss the total effect of mon-
etary policy shocks on bank systemic risk. Using the notation of equation 6, we can write
the total impact of the monetary policy shock on bank systemic risk in the following way:
∂Yi,t
∂Shockt
= β0 +
K∑
k=1
βkBMk,i,t
In figure 5 we show for both the Euro Area and the U.S. histograms of the total impact of
monetary policy shocks on each dependent variable, that are based on the estimation results
presented in table 3. We find that the impact of an expansionary monetary policy shock
on MV is mainly positive for both the Euro Area and the United States, implying that for
most banks accommodative monetary policy actions increase the market value of their equity
16The U.S. data are winsorized at the 1% level, while for the Euro Area banks we winsorize the highest and
the lowest value of each variable in each month. This difference in winsorizing procedures is a consequence
of the lower number of banks in the Euro Area.
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capital. The effect on LRMES, however, differs. For the Euro Area the majority of bank-
year observations exhibit a negative effect on LRMES, which can be primarily attributed
to banks in Euro Area periphery countries (figure 5c). In contrast, for the United States the
impact of expansionary monetary policy shocks on LRMES is positive for most bank-quarter
observations. The complementary effects on LRMES and MV in the Euro Area translate
into an impact on SMV that is positive for the majority of observations, while in the U.S. the
effects counteract each other, so that the median impact on SMV is close to zero. Finally,
we note that although the total impact of monetary policy shocks on bank systemic risk and
its components is heterogeneous, it can become quite large, suggesting that monetary policy
interventions are economically relevant drivers of bank systemic risk.
5.1. Bank heterogeneity and transmission of monetary policy
As discussed in section 3.3, we model the heterogeneous impact of monetary policy shocks
on bank systemic risk using a set of business model variables that capture a bank’s asset,
funding, capital and income structure. We measure a bank’s asset structure by defining a set
of variables that capture the composition of earning assets (the loan ratio), the risk of earning
assets (the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets, or RWA density) and the quality of
the loan portfolio (the proportion of non-performing loans in total loans). We use the ratio
of customer deposits to total liabilities and an unweighted capital ratio, i.e. the ratio of
total equity to total assets, to capture banks’ funding and capital structures, respectively.
As an indicator for banks’ income structures, we use the share of non-interest income in total
income as a proxy for the extent to which they engage in non-traditional income-generating
activities17.
With respect to asset structure, the results in table 3 show that an expansionary monetary
policy shock reduces systemic risk more for banks with higher asset risk. In both the Euro
Area and the United States, the interaction term of the monetary policy shock and the RWA
density is negative for the LRMES and positive for the market value and stressed market
17Because during the financial crisis non-interest income has in some cases become negative, we calculate
the share of non-interest income by dividing the absolute value of non-interest income by the sum of the
absolute values of non-interest income and net interest income (see e.g. Köhler, 2015, and Mergaerts and
Vander Vennet (2016) for similar approaches) .
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value, although the effect on LRMES is not statistically significant in the Euro Area. This
result is consistent with an expansionary monetary policy shock improving the financial
environment (column 3 in figure 1), in line with the negative impact of the monetary policy
shock on market-wide implied volatility and the positive impact on the value of stock market
index (see figure 2). Increasing security prices can cause a positive revaluation effect on the
banks’ securities portfolios. At the same time the market risk of investment portfolios goes
down so that banks using VaR models may see their market risk exposure, which is part
of RWA, decrease. Increasing collateral values may furthermore decrease the probability of
default within the banks’ loan portfolios. Our results indicate that stock markets acknowledge
these effects, which translates into a beneficial effect of expansionary monetary policy shocks
on systemic risk for banks with high asset risk.
Considering the composition of a bank’s assets, we find limited evidence for a negative
impact of the loan ratio on the transmission of an expansionary monetary policy shock to
the market value of Euro Area banks: the interaction term of the monetary policy shock and
the loan ratio is significantly negative. Based on the discussion in section 2.2, a negative
coefficient is consistent with two hypotheses. On the one hand, a high loan ratio could make
banks more vulnerable to a long period of near-zero short-term interest rates and decreasing
long-term interest rates, provoking a negative revenue effect (column 2 in figure 1). However,
easing liquidity and financing conditions could also allow banks to defer acknowledging bad
loans, i.e. forbearance (column 4 in figure 1). The assessment of the relative strength of
these hypotheses requires a deeper inspection of the results. First, in table 3 we find that the
interaction term of the non-interest income share and the monetary policy shock negatively
affects market value in both the Euro Area and the United States. Hence, banks that rely
more on net interest revenues appear to benefit from expansionary monetary policy actions.
This result is not consistent with monetary policy decreasing bank profitability through the
net interest margin, because this hypothesis would suggest that especially banks characterized
by a high reliance on net interest income are vulnerable to expansionary shocks.
Second, we use the regional heterogeneity in the Euro Area to further discriminate be-
tween the two hypotheses. Doubt about the quality of banks’ loan books are likely to be
stronger in Euro Area periphery countries, because these countries experienced deeper reces-
21
sions and weaker recoveries. Lower asset quality, combined with higher exposure to distressed
sovereign debt, which depresses bank profitability and capital buffers, may increase forbear-
ance incentives for banks in these countries. Such forbearance would, however, weigh on
current profitability and lead to future loan impairments (see Peek and Rosengren, 2005).
Acharya et al. (2016) find that the OMT program in the Euro Area allowed banks to ever-
green distressed loans and that this effect was especially strong in the peripheral countries.
However, if the negative effect of the loan ratio interaction works through a decrease of the
net interest margin, one would expect that the impact is negative in both the periphery and
the core. The results in table 4 support the forbearance hypothesis: the effect of the loan
ratio interaction on MV and SMV is significantly negative for the periphery, but not the
core countries.
Finally, we exploit the higher granularity of the U.S. accounting data by examining the
impact of different types of loans. A decreasing net interest margin as a consequence of
expansionary monetary policy should affect all types of loans equally. On the other hand,
forbearance incentives may be larger for banks that rely more on consumer loans or business
loans, rather than real estate loans, because the Federal Reserve explicitly supported the
quality of the latter18. Different studies furthermore indicate that these programs have indeed
had a positive impact on house prices (Rahal, 2016; Gabriel and Lutz, 2015). Again, the
results in table 5 are in line with the forbearance hypothesis. We find that the market
value and stressed market value of banks that rely more on business loans is more negatively
affected by an expansionary monetary policy shock, while a higher reliance on consumer loans
increases the impact of monetary policy on the LRMES.
Apart from asset and income structure, the transmission of monetary policy shocks to
bank systemic risk may also be influenced by the way in which a bank funds its activities,
i.e. through either customer deposits, wholesale debt or through equity capital. Consistent
with Mamatzakis and Bermpei (2016), the results in table 3 indicate that a bank’s funding
18In its 25 November 2008 press release the FOMC motivates its decision to purchase mortgage backed
securities by its intention to support property values: “The Federal Reserve [...] will initiate a program to
purchase the direct obligations of housing-related government-sponsored enterprises [...] This action is being
taken to reduce the cost and increase the availability of credit for the purchase of houses, which in turn
should support housing markets”.
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structure, captured by the share of deposit funding in total liabilities, significantly affects the
transmission of monetary policy to bank systemic risk for U.S. bank holding companies. We
find that the interaction term of the deposit ratio and the monetary policy shock has a positive
impact on LRMES and a significant negative effect on market value. The combination of
these effects furthermore translates into a significantly negative effect on the stressed market
value. However, these results do not allow us to determine whether these effects are caused by
expansionary monetary policy either relieving stock market’s concerns about banks’ funding
risk (column 5 in figure 1) or by incentivizing banks with high deposit ratios to take more
risk (column 2 in figure 1).
We therefore again turn to the more detailed data for the United States sample in table
5. Applying the weighting scheme of DeYoung and Jang (2016), we use the more granular
data of the FR Y-9C reports to construct a variable that mimics the Basel III definition
of the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) as closely as possible. We furthermore replace the
ratio of deposits to liabilities by the ratio of core funding to total funding to better capture
the share of insured deposits. While the coefficients for the share of core funding are in line
with the results in table 3, we find no evidence to suggest that the NSFR, and thus banks’
funding risk, affects the impact of monetary policy shocks on bank systemic risk. As such,
these results provide support to the hypothesis that a higher deposit ratio increases agency
problems, implying that the failure of depositors to adequately price risk strengthens the risk-
taking incentives of banks in response to monetary easing. This conclusion is furthermore
supported by the regression results exploiting the regional differences within the Euro Area
presented in table 4. We find a significant negative effect of the deposit ratio interaction term
on the market value, but only in core countries. Given that wholesale funding conditions
deteriorated more for periphery banks, especially during periods of severe sovereign distress,
the funding risk hypothesis would imply that the impact of the deposit ratio should be more
negative for the periphery sample. However, the strong link between banks and sovereigns
may have weakened the credibility of deposit insurance in these countries19, which may in
19The declining credibility of deposit insurance in the Euro Area periphery is illustrated by the 2013 EU
and IMF proposal to impose a one-time tax on both insured and uninsured deposits in Cyprus in exchange for
financial support. Greece has had to instate capital controls to prevent the banking sector from collapsing
during the 2015 negotiations on the country’s third bail-out package. While the European Commission
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turn have led to better private monitoring, alleviating the risk-taking incentives caused by
expansionary monetary policy. These results are therefore also consistent with the risk-taking
hypothesis.
In addition, the results in table 3 suggest that the capital structure, measured by the
ratio of total equity to total assets, is also relevant for the transmission of monetary policy
to systemic risk for U.S. banks. We find a significantly positive impact on the LRMES and
a negative impact on the stressed market value (columns 4 and 6). The subsample analysis
comparing the core and the periphery Euro Area countries presented in table 4, indicate
that this effect is also present in the Euro Area, but only in the periphery: the effects on
both the market value and stressed market value are significantly negative. These results
imply that better capitalized banks are perceived by markets to become more systemically
risky following an expansionary monetary policy shock, consistent with the existence of a risk
shifting effect (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2016) and also in line with the results of Ricci (2015), Yin
and Yang (2013) and Madura and Schnusenberg (2000). However, the absence of an effect
in core countries indicates that the risk shifting effect may be less important, at least within
the Euro Area. Because funding conditions worsened more for banks in periphery countries,
while large exposures to distressed sovereign debt put pressure on their capital buffers, it is
especially in the periphery countries that a lower capital ratio allows banks to benefit more
from expansionary monetary policies.
Finally, our results indicate that bank size, which we include as a control variable, affects
the transmission of monetary policy to bank systemic risk. For the Euro Area we find
that larger banks benefit more from monetary policy shocks in terms of LRMES, market
value and stressed market value, while for U.S. banks we only find a significant positive
effect on market value. These findings are consistent with Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014) and
Buch et al. (2014) who document that, to the extent that size is correlated with market
power, larger banks can better protect their net interest margins when an extended period
of accommodative monetary policy puts pressure on long-term interest rates. In addition,
smaller banks may rely more on collateral as a substitute for expensive monitoring, so that a
acknowledges the need for a European deposit insurance scheme to complete the banking union, deposit
insurance is still a national responsibility.
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rise in asset prices, and hence collateral values, may increase bank risk by lowering monitoring
incentives.
5.2. Is there a trade-off between traditional monetary policy objectives and financial stability?
Thus far we have examined the impact of the separate bank characteristics on the trans-
mission of monetary policy to stock market perceptions of bank systemic risk. In this section
we evaluate the consequences of the identified transmission channels for financial stability.
Based on our findings, we argue that accommodative monetary policy may contribute to the
buildup of financial vulnerabilities within the banking sector and hence undermine medium
term financial stability. First, our results suggest that for most of the period under study low
short-term interest rates and expansionary unconventional programs have supported banks’
net interest margins (column 1 in figure 1). However, maintaining a very accommodative
monetary policy further in the future may eventually lead to declining net interest margins
(Borio et al., 2015; Borio and Zabai, 2016) and hence more risk-taking, especially by less
capitalized banks that are more susceptible to the search-for-yield channel (Rajan, 2005).
Because a declining NIM also adversely affects the profitability of banks that rely more on
net interest income, such banks may experience more incentives to increase their risk-taking
or to expand to non-interest income sources. While diversifying into non-traditional activi-
ties may bolster profitability (Mergaerts and Vander Vennet, 2016), it may at the same time
increase the correlation between banks’ income streams and hence raise systemic risk (De
Jonghe, 2010).
Second, consistent with Ricci (2015) the results show that, all else equal, banks with a
riskier asset composition, a higher reliance on wholesale funding and low levels of capital
adequacy benefit more (or, at least, suffer less) from expansionary monetary policy inter-
ventions with respect to both LRMES and valuation. Exploiting the differences between
core and periphery countries in the Euro Area furthermore shows that these effects are more
pronounced for banks headquartered in the periphery. The easing of monetary policy in the
years following the financial crisis may therefore in effect have supported less healthy banks.
This implies that an eventual policy tightening will more negatively (or less positively) affect
these risky banks, which could in turn present challenges to the preservation of financial
25
stability in the medium term. Finally, we find evidence suggesting that expansionary mone-
tary policy actions have given banks more room to delay balance sheet cleaning, in line with
Lambert and Ueda (2014) and Acharya et al. (2016). In case of a tightening of monetary
policy, it can be expected that such forbearance may become more difficult and that banks
with lower loan quality will have to recognize the bad loans in their loan books. Our results
furthermore again indicate that this problem could be more severe in Euro Area periphery
countries. In conclusion, we argue that the expansionary regime of monetary policy following
the financial crisis in 2008 has contributed to the buildup of vulnerabilities in the banking
sector. Ultimately, both a continuation of accommodative policies and a tightening of mone-
tary policy may increase these vulnerabilities and imperil the stability of the banking sector,
because they are both likely to harm banks’ net interest margins.
6. Conclusion
Overall, our results support the conjecture that accommodative monetary policy may
increase the risk-taking incentives of banks. Moreover, the finding that loose monetary pol-
icy has supported the weaker banks may increase financial stability risks in the future. In
terms of policy implications, it is clear that longer periods of very low short and long term
interest rates may jeopardize bank profitability and amplify risk-taking incentives. Hence,
measures of exceptional monetary accommodation should be complemented with macropru-
dential measures specifically targeted at the most vulnerable banks. Moreover, after a period
of bank distress it should be recommended that the clean-up of the balance sheets proceeds
in a swift manner, so that legacy and forbearance issues can be avoided. Finally, the switch
from monetary policy accommodation to a tightening stance should be gradual and carefully
guided in order to avoid disruptions among the weaker banks.
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Tables
Table 1: The financial market variables used in the VAR model to obtain the monetary policy shock.
Inflation expectations are based on inflation swap rates. Data are obtained from Datastream.
Euro Area United States
10Y German bund yield 10Y Treasury bill yield
2Y German bund yield 2Y Treasury bill yield
5Y, 5Y fwd. inflation expectation rate 5Y, 5Y fwd. inflation expectation rate
MSCI Europe S&P500
VSTOXX VIX
Spanish 5Y CDS spread
Table 2: Descriptive statistics. Data are obtained from Bankscope and Datastream for the Euro Area and
the FR Y-9C reports and CRSP for the United States.
Euro Area United States
Mean St. Dev. Min Max Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Loans to earning assets 0.63 0.19 0.12 0.88 0.72 0.15 0.07 0.98
Cons. loans to earning assets 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.44
RE loans to earning assets 0.54 0.18 0.00 0.93
Bus. loans to earning assets 0.15 0.10 0.00 0.69
Non-performing loans to loans 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.41 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.21
RWA to earning assets 0.59 0.19 0.20 1.11 0.81 0.13 0.42 1.18
Size 18.04 1.83 14.14 21.47 10.60 1.59 8.45 16.58
Deposits to liabilities 0.48 0.17 0.06 0.91 0.85 0.13 0.09 0.99
Share of core funding 0.70 0.17 0.06 0.97
NSFR 1.09 0.15 0.57 1.80
Equity to assets 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.23
Share of non-interest income 0.37 0.15 0.03 0.86 0.26 0.16 0.01 0.97
Share of fee income 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.20
Share of fiduciary income 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.50
Share of trading income 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.33
Share of insurance income 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.17
∆LRMES -0.002 0.10 -0.46 0.44 -0.001 0.18 -5.77 6.67
∆MV -0.004 0.14 -0.88 1.43 0.006 0.13 -0.75 1.69
∆SMV 0.026 0.33 -0.91 9.97 0.039 0.31 -0.95 4.53
Observations 4502 24467
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Table 3: Baseline regression results. This table shows only the coefficients of the interaction effects βi
(i = 0 . . .K) as presented in equation 6. The model is estimated using bank fixed effects. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered on both the bank and month level to control for within bank autocorrelation and
common shocks. Stars indicate significance levels: *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level respectively.
Euro Area United States
∆LRMES ∆MV ∆SMV ∆LRMES ∆MV ∆SMV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Loans to earning assets -0.018 -0.065** -0.127 0.002 0.008 -0.046
(0.032) (0.032) (0.163) (0.018) (0.019) (0.036)
Non-performing loans to loans -0.010 -0.152 0.005 0.014 0.125 0.269
(0.085) (0.151) (0.254) (0.098) (0.205) (0.251)
RWA to earning assets -0.043 0.147*** 0.264** -0.044*** 0.071** 0.138***
(0.035) (0.052) (0.118) (0.017) (0.033) (0.052)
Size -0.006** 0.014*** 0.041*** 0.001 0.006** 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.015) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008)
Deposits to liabilities -0.009 -0.052 0.199 0.040** -0.048** -0.101**
(0.033) (0.036) (0.227) (0.018) (0.025) (0.042)
Equity to assets 0.067 -0.683 0.481 0.125* -0.168 -0.432**
(0.338) (0.431) (1.259) (0.074) (0.148) (0.176)
Share of non-interest income -0.040 -0.126*** 0.064 0.006 -0.050*** -0.084**
(0.031) (0.044) (0.144) (0.008) (0.018) (0.037)
Constant 0.154** -0.058 -0.869* -0.011 -0.036 0.056
(0.068) (0.079) (0.466) (0.030) (0.036) (0.100)
Observations 4502 4502 4502 24467 24467 24467
Banks 63 63 63 438 438 438
R2 (within) 0.007 0.203 0.045 0.004 0.065 0.008
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Table 4: Panel regression results in which we exploit the regional differences within the Euro Area to
examine the transmission of monetary policy shocks. The periphery countries are Greece, Italy, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain. This table shows only the coefficients of the interaction effects βi (i = 0 . . .K) as
presented in equation 6. The model is estimated using bank fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered on both the bank and month level to control for within bank autocorrelation and common shocks.
Stars indicate significance levels: *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
Euro Area Periphery Euro Area Core
∆LRMES ∆MV ∆SMV ∆LRMES ∆MV ∆SMV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Loans to earning assets 0.074 -0.113** -0.256*** -0.060** -0.010 -0.413
(0.045) (0.046) (0.092) (0.025) (0.052) (0.529)
Non-performing loans to loans -0.007 -0.122 -0.165 0.039 -0.517* 0.591
(0.093) (0.179) (0.256) (0.212) (0.274) (1.085)
RWA to earning assets -0.084* 0.154** 0.241** -0.016 0.194*** -0.230
(0.051) (0.069) (0.094) (0.050) (0.067) (0.328)
Size -0.011*** 0.016*** 0.040*** -0.007*** 0.018*** 0.038*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.021)
Deposits to liabilities 0.009 -0.049 -0.094 0.009 -0.098* 0.594
(0.035) (0.040) (0.083) (0.020) (0.053) (0.631)
Equity to assets 0.577 -1.066** -1.925** -0.595 -0.342 4.166
(0.405) (0.521) (0.831) (0.391) (0.583) (2.566)
Share of non-interest income -0.071 -0.096 -0.035 -0.002 -0.169*** 0.012
(0.053) (0.062) (0.156) (0.028) (0.052) (0.213)
Constant 0.167** -0.060 -0.342** 0.194*** -0.169 -0.856
(0.068) (0.096) (0.164) (0.056) (0.136) (0.527)
Observations 2891 2891 2891 1611 1611 1611
Banks 37 37 37 26 26 26
R2 (within) 0.016 0.189 0.108 0.012 0.311 0.041
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Table 5: Panel regression results in which we exploit the granularity of the U.S. data to examine the
transmission of monetary policy shocks. For comparison we also add the baseline results as presented in
table 3. This table shows only the coefficients of the interaction effects βi (i = 0 . . .K) as presented in
equation 6. The model is estimated using bank fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on
both the bank and month level to control for within bank autocorrelation and common shocks. Stars indicate
significance levels: *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
∆LRMES ∆MV ∆SMV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Loans to earning assets 0.002 0.008 -0.046
(0.018) (0.019) (0.036)
Cons. loans to earning assets 0.044** 0.007 -0.076
(0.023) (0.018) (0.056)
RE loans to earning assets 0.004 0.004 -0.039
(0.014) (0.012) (0.029)
Bus. loans to earning assets 0.018 -0.042* -0.138***
(0.028) (0.022) (0.048)
Non-performing loans to loans 0.014 0.065 0.125 0.044 0.269 0.111
(0.098) (0.104) (0.205) (0.203) (0.251) (0.242)
RWA to earning assets -0.044*** -0.043** 0.071** 0.070** 0.138*** 0.135***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.033) (0.030) (0.052) (0.046)
Size 0.001 0.001 0.006** 0.004 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008)
Deposits to liabilities 0.040** -0.048** -0.101**
(0.018) (0.025) (0.042)
Share of core funding 0.043** -0.046** -0.099**
(0.017) (0.023) (0.040)
NSFR 0.008 -0.027 -0.044
(0.012) (0.022) (0.038)
Equity to assets 0.125* 0.063 -0.168 -0.077 -0.432** -0.277*
(0.074) (0.069) (0.148) (0.111) (0.176) (0.157)
Share of non-interest income 0.006 -0.050*** -0.084**
(0.008) (0.018) (0.037)
Share of fee income -0.013 -0.001 -0.026
(0.019) (0.024) (0.046)
Share of fiduciary income -0.061 0.208** 0.200
(0.059) (0.105) (0.158)
Share of trading income 0.004 0.021 0.046
(0.032) (0.072) (0.208)
Share of insurance income 0.026 -0.093* -0.177***
(0.039) (0.054) (0.060)
Constant -0.011 -0.009 -0.036 -0.020 0.056 0.074
(0.030) (0.035) (0.036) (0.046) (0.100) (0.127)
Observations 24467 24467 24467 24467 24467 24467
Banks 438 438 438 438 438 438
R2 (within) 0.004 0.005 0.065 0.070 0.008 0.011
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Figures
Figure 1: Diagram summarizing the heterogeneous transmission of monetary policy to bank systemic risk.
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Figure 2: Impulse response function of the variables to a unit monetary policy shock. Gray areas represent
68% confidence intervals that are obtained through a stationary bootstrap with expected block length 10
for non-announcement days. Announcement day residuals are bootstrapped separately. The horizontal axis
represents the horizon of the impulse response function in working days, i.e. the IRF’s are plotted for a
horizon of one quarter (13 weeks).
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Figure 3: Time series of the cumulative monetary policy shocks for the Euro Area and the United States.
An increase of the cumulative shock series reflects an expansionary monetary policy announcement. The
shocks have been standardized so that a unit increase corresponds to a 25 basis point decrease on impact of
the Spanish 5 year CDS spread and the 10 year treasury bill yield for Euro Area and the the United States,
respectively. Vertical lines represent the set of announcement dates used in the estimation of the shock.
Circles indicate the highlighted announcement days.
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Figure 4: Isoquants for equal levels of systemic risk. The horizontal axis represents the pre-shock level of
the capital ratio, while the vertical axis reflects the proportion of equity capital that would be lost in the
event of a severe system-wide financial shock. The labels on the isoquants indicate the post-shock capital
ratios, so that a lower level reflects higher systemic riskiness.
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Figure 5: Histograms and estimated kernel densities for the total impact of a unit monetary policy shock
on ∆LRMES (in percentage points), ∆MV and ∆SMV (both as percentages) over a one-month horizon.
Figures 5a and 5b are based on the results presented in table 3, while figure 5c is constructed using the
results of table 4, in which we perform separate estimations for Euro Area core and periphery countries. The
periphery countries are Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.
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AppendixA. Details of monetary policy announcements
Table A.1: ECB announcement dates and content.
Date Details of announcement
08/10/2008 MRO rate decreased to 3.75% + The GovC decided to adopt a fixed rate tender procedure
with full allotment
13/10/2008 The GovC decided to conduct U.S. dollar liquidity-providing operations at FRFA
15/10/2008 The GovC decided to expand the list of assets eligible as collateral, enhance the provision
of longer-term refinancing operations, and provide U.S. dollar liquidity through foreign
exchange swaps
06/11/2008 MRO rate decreased to 3.25%
04/12/2008 MRO rate decreased to 2.50%
18/12/2008 The GovC decided that the main refinancing operations will continue to be carried out
through a fixed rate tender procedure with full allotment for as long as needed
19/12/2008 The GovC decided to continue conducting U.S. dollar liquidity-providing operations
15/01/2009 MRO rate decreased to 2.00%
05/02/2009 Interest rates remain unchanged
05/03/2009 The GovC decided to continue the fixed rate tender procedure with full allotment for all
main refinancing operations, special-term refinancing operations and supplementary and
regular longer-term refinancing operations for as long as needed + MRO rate decreased to
1.50%
02/04/2009 MRO rate decreased to 1.25%
06/04/2009 The GovC decided to establish a temporary reciprocal currency arrangement (swap line)
with the Fed
07/05/2009 The GovC decided to proceed with the ECS. In particular, the GovC decided to purchase
euro-denominated covered bonds issued in the Euro Area, and to conduct
liquidity-providing longer-term refinancing operations with a maturity of one year, MRO
rate decreased to 1%
04/06/2009 The GovC decided upon the technical modalities of the CBPP1
02/07/2009 Interest rates remain unchanged
06/08/2009 Interest rates remain unchanged
03/09/2009 Interest rates remain unchanged
08/10/2009 Interest rates remain unchanged
05/11/2009 Interest rates remain unchanged
03/12/2009 The GovC decided to continue conducting its main refinancing operations as fixed rate
tender procedures with full allotment for as long as is needed, and to enhance the provision
of longer-term refinancing operations (no interest changes)
14/01/2010 Interest rates remain unchanged
04/02/2010 Interest rates remain unchanged
04/03/2010 The GovC decided to continue conducting its main refinancing operations as fixed rate
tender procedures with full allotment for as long as is needed, and to return to variable rate
tender procedures in the regular 3-month longer-term refinancing operations
08/04/2010 Interest rates remain unchanged
06/05/2010 Interest rates remain unchanged
10/05/2010 The GovC decided to proceed with the SMP, to reactivate the temporary liquidity swap
lines with the Fed, to adopt a fixed-rate tender procedure with full allotment in the regular
3-month longer-term refinancing operations, and to conduct new special longer-term
refinancing operations
10/06/2010 The GovC decided to adopt a fixed rate tender procedure with full allotment in the regular
3-month longer-term refinancing operations
08/07/2010 Interest rates remain unchanged
28/07/2010 Collateral rules tightened, revised haircuts
05/08/2010 Interest rates remain unchanged
02/09/2010 The GovC decided to continue to conduct its main refinancing operations as fixed rate
tender procedures with full allotment for as long as necessary, and to conduct 3-month
longer-term refinancing operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment (no
interest changes)
07/10/2010 Interest rates remain unchanged
04/11/2010 Interest rates remain unchanged
02/12/2010 The GovC decided to continue to conduct its main refinancing operations as fixed rate
tender procedures with full allotment for as long as necessary, and to conduct 3-month
longer-term refinancing operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment (no
interest changes)
17/12/2010 The ECB announced a temporary swap facility with the Bank of England
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Table A.1: ECB announcement dates and content.
Date Details of announcement
13/01/2011 Interest rates remain unchanged
03/02/2011 Interest rates remain unchanged
03/03/2011 The GovC decided to continue to conduct its main refinancing operations as fixed rate
tender procedures with full allotment for as long as necessary, and to conduct 3-month
longer-term refinancing operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment (no
interest changes)
07/04/2011 MRO rate increased to 1.25%
05/05/2011 Interest rates remain unchanged
09/06/2011 The GovC decided to continue to conduct its main refinancing operations as fixed rate
tender procedures with full allotment for as long as necessary, and to conduct 3-month
longer-term refinancing operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment (no
interest changes)
07/07/2011 MRO rate increased to 1.50%
04/08/2011 The GovC decided to continue conducting its main refinancing operations as fixed rate
tender procedures with full allotment for as long as necessary, to conduct 3-month
longer-term refinancing operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment, and
to conduct a liquidity-providing supplementary longer-term refinancing operation with a
maturity of six months as a fixed rate tender procedure with full allotment,SMP covers
Spain and Italy (no interest changes)
08/08/2011 The GovC decided to actively implement its Securities Markets Programme for Italy and
Spain
08/09/2011 Interest rates remain unchanged
15/09/2011 The GovC decided to conduct three U.S. dollar liquidity-providing operations in
coordination with other central banks
06/10/2011 The GovC decided to continue conducting its main refinancing operations as fixed rate
tender procedures with full allotment for as long as necessary, to conduct 3-month
longer-term refinancing operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment, to
conduct two liquidity-providing supplementary longer-term refinancing operation with a
maturity of twelve and thirteen months as a fixed rate tender procedure with full allotment,
and to launch a new covered bond purchase program (CBPP2)
03/11/2011 The GovC decided upon the technical modalities of CBPP2, MRO rate decreased 1.25%
(marginal lending facility:2%, deposit facility: 0.5%)
30/11/2011 The GovC decided in cooperation with other central banks the establishment of a
temporary network of reciprocal swap lines
08/12/2011 The GovC decided to conduct two longer-term refinancing operations with a maturity of
three years and to increase collateral availability,reserve ratio to 1%, MRO rate to 1%
12/01/2012 Interest rates remain unchanged
09/02/2012 The GovC approved specific national eligibility criteria and risk control measures for the
temporary acceptance in a number of countries of additional credit claims as collateral in
Eurosystem credit operations (no interest changes)
28/02/2012 The Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) has decided to temporarily
suspend the eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or fully guaranteed by the
Hellenic Republic for use as collateral in Eurosystem monetary policy operations.
08/03/2012 Interest rates remain unchanged
04/04/2012 Interest rates remain unchanged
03/05/2012 Interest rates remain unchanged
06/06/2012 The GovC decided to continue to conduct its main refinancing operations as fixed rate
tender procedures with full allotment for as long as necessary, and to conduct 3-month
longer-term refinancing operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment
22/06/2012 The GovC took further measures to increase collateral availability for counterparties
05/07/2012 MRO rate decreased to 0.75%, deposit facility rate to 0
26/07/2012 Draghi’s London speech (“. . . the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the
euro.”)
02/08/2012 Interest rates remain unchanged
06/09/2012 The GovC announced the technical details of OMT (no ex-ante size limit) and decided on
additional measures to preserve collateral availability (no interest changes)
04/10/2012 Interest rates remain unchanged
08/11/2012 Interest rates remain unchanged
06/12/2012 The GovC decided to continue conducting its main refinancing operations as fixed rate
tender procedures with full allotment for as long as necessary, and to conduct 3-month
longer-term refinancing operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment
10/01/2013 Interest rates remain unchanged
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Table A.1: ECB announcement dates and content.
Date Details of announcement
07/02/2013 Interest rates remain unchanged
07/03/2013 Interest rates remain unchanged
22/03/2013 ECB announces changes to the use as collateral of certain uncovered
government-guaranteed bank bonds
04/04/2013 Interest rates remain unchanged
02/05/2013 ECB announces change in eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or guaranteed
by the Cypriot government ,MRO rate to 0.5%, FRFA extended to July 2014
06/06/2013 Interest rates remain unchanged
28/06/2013 Eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the Republic of Cyprus
04/07/2013 The Governing Council expects the key ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower
levels for an extended period of time .
01/08/2013 Interest rates remain unchanged
05/09/2013 Interest rates remain unchanged
02/10/2013 Interest rates remain unchanged
10/10/2013 ECB and the People’s Bank of China establish a bilateral currency swap agreement
31/10/2013 ECB establishes standing swap arrangements with other central banks
07/11/2013 MRO rate decreases to 0,25%
22/11/2013 ECB suspends early repayments of the three-year LTRO’s during the year-end period
05/12/2013 Interest rates remain unchanged
09/01/2014 Interest rates remain unchanged, the ECB emphasized the importance of the forward
guidance through the sentence "we firmly reiterate our forward guidance "
06/02/2014 Interest rates remain unchanged
06/03/2014 Interest rates remain unchanged
03/04/2014 Interest rates remain unchanged
08/05/2014 Interest rates remain unchanged
05/06/2014 ECB decides to conduct a series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO’s)
aimed at improving bank lending and to intensify preparatory work related to outright
purchases of asset-backed securities (ABS). , ECB introduces a negative deposit facility
interest rate , MRO rate decreases to 0,15%
03/07/2014 ECB announces further details of the targeted longer-term refinancing operations
07/08/2014 Interest rates remain unchanged
22/08/2014 Draghi hints on QE (Jackson Hole speech)
04/09/2014 ECB modifies loan-level reporting requirements for some asset-backed securities/MRO rate
decreases to 0,05%
02/10/2014 ECB announces operational details of asset-backed securities and covered bond purchase
programs (no interest changes)
06/11/2014 Interest rates remain unchanged
07/11/2014 ECB suspends early repayments of the three-year LTRO’s during the year-end period
04/12/2014 Interest rates remain unchanged
22/01/2015 ECB announces a modification to the interest rate applicable to future targeted
longer-term refinancing operations, ECB announces expanded asset purchase program
04/02/2015 Eligibility of Greek bonds used as collateral in Eurosystem monetary policy operations
05/03/2015 Interest rates remain unchanged
15/04/2015 Interest rates remain unchanged
03/06/2015 Interest rates remain unchanged
16/07/2015 Interest rates remain unchanged
03/09/2015 Interest rates remain unchanged
22/10/2015 Interest rates remain unchanged
03/12/2015 Deposit facility rate decreases to -0,3% + extension of QE "until end March 2017"
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Date Details of announcement
08/10/2008 The Federal Open Market Committee has decided to lower its target for the federal funds
rate 50 basis points to 1-1/2 percent.
14/10/2008 FOMC authorizes an increase in the size of its temporary reciprocal currency arrangement
with the Bank of Japan
29/10/2008 The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to lower its target for the federal funds
rate 50 basis points to 1 percent.
25/11/2008 Federal Reserve announces the creation of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility
(TALF) and will initiate a program to purchase the direct obligations of housing-related
government-sponsored enterprises (GSE’s)–Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal
Home Loan Banks–and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) backed by Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac, and Ginnie Mae.
01/12/2008 Bernanke, speaking in Austin, indicates that the Fed may engage in future QE actions
-specifically mentioning long-term Treasuries
16/12/2008 The Federal Reserve cuts the target Federal Funds rate to zero
30/12/2008 Federal Reserve announces details of program to purchase mortgage-backed securities
28/01/2009 FOMC keeps rates low, confirms future actions could include QE expansion
18/03/2009 Expansion of QE, more than doubling agency purchases and adding $300 billion in
long-term Treasuries, for a total commitment of $1.2T, the Committee decided to purchase
up to an additional $750 billion of agency mortgage-backed securities, and to increase its
purchases of agency debt this year by up to $100 billion to a total of up to $200 billion.
29/04/2009 The Federal Reserve will purchase a total of up to $1.25 trillion of agency mortgage-backed
securities and up to $200 billion of agency debt by the end of the year. In addition, the
Federal Reserve will buy up to $300 billion of Treasury securities by autumn
19/05/2009 Federal Reserve announces that certain high-quality commercial mortgage-backed securities
will become eligible collateral under the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility
(TALF)
24/06/2009 The Federal Reserve will purchase a total of up to $1.25 trillion of agency mortgage-backed
securities and up to $200 billion of agency debt by the end of the year. In addition, the
Federal Reserve will buy up to $300 billion of Treasury securities by autumn.
25/06/2009 The Federal Reserve on Thursday announced extensions of and modifications to a number
of its liquidity programs.
12/08/2009 Fed funds to be held near zero, finished purchasing agency assets by October
23/09/2009 Finished purchasing Treasuries in "next few months":As previously announced, the Federal
Reserve’s purchases of $300 billion of Treasury securities will be completed by the end of
October 2009.the Federal Reserve will purchase a total of $1.25 trillion of agency
mortgage-backed securities and up to $200 billion of agency debt.
24/09/2009 The Federal Reserve on Thursday announced schedules for operations under the Term
Auction Facility (TAF) and the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) through January
2010 and other information related to those facilities
04/11/2009 The amount of agency debt purchases, while somewhat less than the previously announced
maximum of $200 billion, is consistent with the recent path of purchases and reflects the
limited availability of agency debt. In order to promote a smooth transition in markets, the
Committee will gradually slow the pace of its purchases of both agency debt and agency
mortgage-backed securities and anticipates that these transactions will be executed by the
end of the first quarter of 2010
16/12/2009 The Committee and the Board of Governors anticipate that most of the Federal Reserve’s
special liquidity facilities will expire on February 1, 2010. The amounts provided under the
Term Auction Facility will continue to be scaled back in early 2010. The anticipated
expiration dates for the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility remain set at June 30,
2010, for loans backed by new-issue commercial mortgage-backed securities and March 31,
2010, for loans backed by all other types of collateral
27/01/2010 To provide support to mortgage lending and housing markets and to improve overall
conditions in private credit markets, the Federal Reserve is in the process of purchasing
$1.25 trillion of agency mortgage-backed securities and about $175 billion of agency debt.
16/03/2010 To provide support to mortgage lending and housing markets and to improve overall
conditions in private credit markets, the Federal Reserve has been purchasing $1.25 trillion
of agency mortgage-backed securities and about $175 billion of agency debt
28/04/2010 The Committee will maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent
and continues to anticipate that economic conditions, including low rates of resource
utilization, subdued inflation trends, and stable inflation expectations, are likely to warrant
exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period. The Committee
will continue to monitor the economic outlook and financial developments and will employ
its policy tools as necessary to promote economic recovery and price stability.
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09/05/2010 FOMC statement: Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of Canada, Bank of
England, and Swiss National Bank announce reestablishment of temporary U.S. dollar
liquidity swap facilities
10/05/2010 FOMC statement: FOMC authorizes re-establishment of temporary U.S. dollar liquidity
swap arrangement with the Bank of Japan
11/05/2010 Federal Reserve releases agreements with foreign central banks to reestablish temporary
dollar swap facilities
23/06/2010 The Committee will maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent
and continues to anticipate that economic conditions, including low rates of resource
utilization, subdued inflation trends, and stable inflation expectations, are likely to warrant
exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period.
10/08/2010 The Committee will maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent
and continues to anticipate that economic conditions, including low rates of resource
utilization, subdued inflation trends, and stable inflation expectations, are likely to warrant
exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period. The Fed will begin
reinvesting earnings from agency purchases back into Treasuries to maintain the balance
sheet
27/08/2010 Bernanke Speech at Jackson Hole: Bernanke hints on QE2
08/09/2010 The Federal Reserve Board on Wednesday announced that it has authorized ongoing
small-value offerings of term deposits under the Term Deposit Facility (TDF).
21/09/2010 The Committee will maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent
and continues to anticipate that economic conditions, including low rates of resource
utilization, subdued inflation trends, and stable inflation expectations, are likely to warrant
exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period + Fed commits to
maintaining reinvestment of earnings
03/11/2010 The Committee intends to purchase a further $600 billion of longer-term Treasury
securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011, a pace of about $75 billion per month.
14/12/2010 The Committee will maintain its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its
securities holdings. In addition, the Committee intends to purchase $600 billion of
longer-term Treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011, a pace of about
$75 billion per month.
21/12/2010 FOMC statement: Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of Japan, Bank of
Canada, Bank of England, and Swiss National Bank announce extension of temporary U.S.
dollar liquidity swap facilities
26/01/2011 The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its
securities holdings and intends to purchase $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities
by the end of the second quarter of 2011
15/03/2011 The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its
securities holdings and intends to purchase $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities
by the end of the second quarter of 2012
27/04/2011 Fed hints at Maturity Extension Program ("Operation twist") and announces end of QE2
as planned + the Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal
payments from its securities holdings and will complete purchases of $600 billion of
longer-term Treasury securities by the end of the current quarter.
22/06/2011 The Committee will complete its purchases of $600 billion of longer-term Treasury
securities by the end of this month and will maintain its existing policy of reinvesting
principal payments from its securities holdings.
29/06/2011 Federal Reserve and other central banks announce an extension of the existing temporary
U.S. dollar liquidity swap arrangements through August 1, 2012
09/08/2011 The Committee also will maintain its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from
its securities holdings to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least
through mid-2013.
26/08/2011 Bernanke Speech at Jackson Hole: The Fed chairman did not announce third round of QE,
but reiterated the "range of tools" available to the Fed
21/09/2011 The Committee decided today to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities.
The Committee intends to purchase, by the end of June 2012, $400 billion of Treasury
securities with remaining maturities of 6 years to 30 years and to sell an equal amount of
Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 3 years or less.
02/11/2011 The Committee decided today to continue its program to extend the average maturity of
its holdings of securities and to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate
at least through mid-2013.
30/11/2011 Coordinated central bank action to address pressures in global money markets : liquidity
swap agreements
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13/12/2011 The Committee is maintaining its existing policies of reinvesting principal payments from
its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities and to warrant
exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013.
25/01/2012 The Committee expects to maintain a highly accommodative stance for monetary policy
and to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014.
13/03/2012 The Committee expects to maintain a highly accommodative stance for monetary policy
and to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014.
25/04/2012 The Committee expects to maintain a highly accommodative stance for monetary policy
and to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014.
20/06/2012 MEP is expanded by an additional $267 billion
28/06/2012 The Federal Reserve Board on Thursday announced that it agreed with the Treasury
Department that it was appropriate to reduce from $4.3 billion to $1.4 billion the credit
protection Treasury is providing for the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility
(TALF).
01/08/2012 The Committee expects to maintain a highly accommodative stance for monetary policy
and to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014.
22/08/2012 FOMC minutes: the FED will take new measures if necessary
31/08/2012 Bernanke Speech at Jackson Hole: Bernanke hints on QE3
13/09/2012 The Committee agreed today to increase policy accommodation by purchasing additional
agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month. the Committee also
decided today to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and
currently anticipates that exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate are likely to be
warranted at least through mid-2015.
24/10/2012 The Committee will continue purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a
pace of $40 billion per month
12/12/2012 The Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4
percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds
rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2
percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half
percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal + QE3 Expansion:
adding $45 billion per month in Treasury purchases
30/01/2013 The Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4
percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds
rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2
percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half
percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal,
20/03/2013 The Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4
percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds
rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2
percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half
percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal,
01/05/2013 The Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4
percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds
rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2
percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half
percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal,
22/05/2013 Bernanke’s actual testimony admits the possibility of tapering in the near future ("taper
tantrum" event)
19/06/2013 The Fed will continue purchases in near future; Bernanke’s accompanying comments
discuss tapering purchases later that year and ceasing by following summer
31/07/2013 The Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4
percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds
rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2
percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half
percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal,
18/09/2013 FED decides not to tamper: improvement but the Committee decided to await more
evidence that progress will be sustained before adjusting the pace of its purchases
30/10/2013 FED decides not to tamper: the Committee decided to await more evidence that progress
will be sustained before adjusting the pace of its purchases
18/12/2013 The Committee decided to modestly reduce the pace of its asset purchases.
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29/01/2014 The Committee decided to make a further measured reduction in the pace of its asset
purchases. Beginning in February, the Committee will add to its holdings of agency
mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $30 billion per month rather than $35 billion per
month, and will add to its holdings of longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $35
billion per month rather than $40 billion per month.
19/03/2014 The Committee will add to its holdings of agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of
$25 billion per month rather than $30 billion per month, and will add to its holdings of
longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $30 billion per month rather than $35 billion
per month.
30/04/2014 the Committee will add to its holdings of agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of
$20 billion per month rather than $25 billion per month, and will add to its holdings of
longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $25 billion per month rather than $30 billion
per month.
18/06/2014 The Committee will add to its holdings of agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of
$15 billion per month rather than $20 billion per month, and will add to its holdings of
longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $20 billion per month rather than $25 billion
per month.
30/07/2014 The Committee will add to its holdings of agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of
$10 billion per month rather than $15 billion per month, and will add to its holdings of
longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $15 billion per month rather than $20 billion
per month.
17/09/2014 The Committee will add to its holdings of agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of
$5 billion per month rather than $10 billion per month, and will add to its holdings of
longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $10 billion per month rather than $15 billion
per month+the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) discussed ways to normalize the
stance of monetary policy and the Federal Reserve’s securities holdings.
29/10/2014 However, if incoming information indicates faster progress toward the Committee’s
employment and inflation objectives than the Committee now expects, then increases in the
target range for the federal funds rate are likely to occur sooner than currently anticipated.
Conversely, if progress proves slower than expected, then increases in the target range are
likely to occur later than currently anticipated.
17/12/2014 The committee judges that it can be patient in beginning to normalize the stance of
monetary policy
28/01/2015 The Committee judges that it can be patient in beginning to normalize the stance of
monetary policy.
02/02/2015 The Federal Reserve plans to conduct a series of three weekly TDF operations in February
that offer 21-day term deposits with an early withdrawal feature
18/03/2015 The Committee judges that an increase in the target range for the federal funds rate
remains unlikely at the April FOMC meeting.
29/04/2015 The Committee anticipates that it will be appropriate to raise the target range for the
federal funds rate when it has seen further improvement in the labor market and is
reasonably confident that inflation will move back to its 2 percent objective over the
medium term.
17/06/2015 The Committee anticipates that it will be appropriate to raise the target range for the
federal funds rate when it has seen further improvement in the labor market and is
reasonably confident that inflation will move back to its 2 percent objective over the
medium term.
29/07/2015 The Committee anticipates that it will be appropriate to raise the target range for the
federal funds rate when it has seen further improvement in the labor market and is
reasonably confident that inflation will move back to its 2 percent objective over the
medium term.
17/09/2015 The Committee anticipates that it will be appropriate to raise the target range for the
federal funds rate when it has seen further improvement in the labor market and is
reasonably confident that inflation will move back to its 2 percent objective over the
medium term.
28/10/2015 The Committee anticipates that it will be appropriate to raise the target range for the
federal funds rate when it has seen further improvement in the labor market and is
reasonably confident that inflation will move back to its 2 percent objective over the
medium term.
16/12/2015 The Committee decided to raise the target range for the federal funds rate to 1/4 to 1/2
percent.
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